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ESSAYS




The question I wish to raise is whether one must believe what one
says when one makes a statement of law. The language of belief that
we know, and from which moral discourse and the moral never stray
far: do judges, lawyers, law participate in it?
Any such question is but an aspect of a larger question, indeed
issue, of what we may call the objectivity of legal language. It is raised
perhaps most acutely by the broad claims now being made for artificial
intelligence and in particular for the computer programming of legal
advice (as a species of what is called, in that field of applied science, an
"expert system"). But it arises also when we contemplate legal texts
bureaucratically produced - texts that are not written by the person
who signs them. It is to this latter, more limited, and more familiar
context that I will direct our consideration here. The shadow of Her-
bert Simon's Sciences of the ArtificialI we will leave to flicker in the
background.
Initially the question of believing what one says in legal discourse
must be approached as a methodological problem, part of the peren-
nial task of coming to grips with and trying to understand lawyers'
method and particularly lawyers' close reading of legal texts. Cer-
tainly we will be attempting to do that here in some small way, keep-
ing in mind that among working lawyers are judicial officers (judges)
as well as legal advisers (officers of the court) and those lawyers (not
officers at all) who teach and write in the schools.
But the question cannot be cast or left only as a problem of
t Copyright © 1987 by Joseph Vining.
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method. It is a question of substance also. Any inquiry, however lim-
ited, into the place of belief of any kind in legal discourse inevitably
takes us to the question of the degree to which law must be rooted in
the concrete and historical ground of our existence, what we variously
call the actual or the authentic. Law, in the course of its conception,
makes a claim upon us, speaks to us and troubles us as we go about
our business. If it does not, if we feel no claim, we may wonder
whether that to which someone may be pointing with the word "law"
is law.
This is why I have taken for a title "law and enchantment." I do
not think we are enchanted by illusion. We are disenchanted when
what appeared to us to be actual turns out to be an illusion. We know
there is at the very least a drive for the actual and the authentic in law,
revealed in any number of ways. Think of our interest in whether the
facts of a case are actual facts or only hypothetical facts; or our inter-
est in what the grounds of an administrative decision actually are, as
opposed to a mere rationalization of the decision; or even our interest
in what the actual words of a statute are as opposed to a paraphrase.
What we want to ask, or begin to ask, is how far law's drive for the
actual and the authentic goes. It may in fact be quite as pressing as
the similar drives of literature, art, and philosophy - though most
would be disposed to deny it: "Lawyers meaning what they say?
Surely not. Belief? Surely that has nothing to do with law."
II. LAW AND OBLIGATION, METHOD AND LAW,
METHOD AND ATrITUDE
It will be useful to begin with a methodological excursion, in the
form of some observations about discussions of legal obligation.
Moral and political philosophers sometimes, indeed I think more
than sometimes, argue about legal obligation by posing some specific
example - jaywalking, running a stop sign, parking across the side-
walk - and asking whether there is an absolute or prima facie obliga-
tion to obey the applicable law and what sorts of reasons (reasons of
self-interest, reasons that themselves imply obligation) or what degrees
of reason (loss of $1,000, loss of $10,000, loss of life or limb) are suffi-
cient or necessary to counterbalance whatever obligation there is to
obey the law. What they do not do as a general matter, at least in my
experience of such arguments, is ask at the very beginning what the
law is they are talking about, what its content is, what it actually com-
mands or says or indicates to the person about whose obligations they
are talking. Anthropologists are illustratively different in this regard,
usually most careful to establish the details of the symbols, stories,
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language, and grammar of the culture they study and the details of the
example of the culture with which they work. But the philosopher
and the political theorist rather readily commit the sin which the law
student (like the anthropologist) is warned against from the beginning:
of assuming what the law is, holding that constant, and then working
out to other factors and other considerations. Before the launching
upon what is of real interest - obligation, counter-obligation - hands
are waved toward some statutory formulation or some citable judicial
opinion and all (or all but the lawyer) move on. They are understand-
ably impatient with the lawyer's tentativeness in the selection and
reading of texts and the lawyer's worry over the translation of mean-
ing. But in consequence their ensuing talk may be about a fiction,
without roots in the world. There is of course nothing wrong in talk-
ing about fiction, but they do not purport to be speaking like novelists
about imaginary worlds and seeking the truth of things in that way.
Now since the content of the law - what, if anything, the law is
actually saying to us - is a question and not a fact which can be
determined or intuited without the exercise of legal method, it is evi-
dent that lawyers and judges, and citizens too, must engage in some
activity before anyone can even get to the point of asking whether
there is an obligation to obey the law. And, as in other situations in
life, in engaging in this activity there are two large and polar attitudes
they can take toward the materials with which they work.
On the one hand they can read the materials searching for the pur-
pose of a statement in the light of other statements made, asking what
its meaning is. On the other hand they can hold the materials entirely
outside themselves and approach them quite manipulatively and stra-
tegically. As law students go through school they are trained in both
these skills, one of reading in what is called "good faith" and the other
of reading in an adversarial and manipulative way. Students also learn
that given enough time and money (and time is a commodity which
can be sometimes bought and sometimes secured through manipula-
tion) they can reduce a set of apparent commands to a virtual dead
letter as far as its impact on their doing or their clients' doing what
they wish to do. Law students learn this - indeed children learn this
growing up, though less by training than by unintended example.
They may be stumped by a set of words which are strung together in a
grammatical way and which have some ordinarily perceived meanings
of an abstract kind, they may be stumped for a while, but they will be
stumped in the same way that someone in a canoe hitting a post in a
river may be stumped for a while before he finds a way around it.
The reduction of a set of texts to a dead letter, the skirting of them,
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the draining of them of meaning and content, does not mean that they
do not exist. Of course they exist and like posts they can have some
effect, delaying or channeling. But they are not at all the same as a set
of texts or words or commands that carry some obligation to pay at-
tention to them for what they say and not merely as something to be
manipulated. In cases of the first kind - the post to be gotten around
- commands are heard and dealt with rather as the adolescent re-
sponds to the words of a cold adult. Only in cases of the second kind
can one begin to talk about the authority of the law. In talking about it
one is talking about obligation and blame, words that simply have no
place in the game-playing and manipulation that are associated with
the first attitude.
It may be a convenient summary to say that the question of obliga-
tion is to a large extent a question of attitude as one proceeds toward a
statement of law, and is not a question whether there is or is not some-
thing attached to the something we call the law, which can be de-
scribed as obligation or prima facie obligation. The content of the law,
the obligation to obey it, and the definition of what obedience consists
of, emerge not one after another in the mind - or in legal analysis -
but together.2
This should not be thought a particularly odd or striking conclu-
sion, since in fact the law does not exist in the world in what is often
called an objective way, and lawyers have always known that. Insofar
2. We should note here also the particular distinction lawyers make between statements that
present a mere choice and statements that raise some degree of obligation. Not only is it unclear
just what the law might be on, for example, sidewalk parking, not only would one have to do
some work before one could conclude that in some actual situation someone had violated or
disobeyed the law by parking across a sidewalk: even if all were to grant that there was a per-
fectly clear and understandable formula, a sidewalk parking example might still be treated as a
species of channeling or choice-presenting of the kind that is often found in taxation, where
essentially a price is sought to be put on a choice.
If, that is, one wants to risk a fine - if one wants to risk a certain amount of money - one
can occupy the public space for a time, just as, to take the experience perhaps most common, one
can park in a parking spot without putting a quarter in the meter if one wants to risk a $5 ticket
(or, rather uncommonly, can smoke marijuana in at least one university town if one is willing to
risk a similar $5 ticket for possession). There may be no real blame attached to the parking in
the empty space or, perhaps, across the sidewalk. The question whether to park would be what is
sometimes called a "private" one for the individual. The alternative and contrast are statements
to be taken into the most serious account in the course of making a decision, and carrying with
them a measure of not only obligation but the mirror image of obligation - blame - for not
paying attention to them and taking them into account in an affirmative way. In some situations
legal analysis moves to treat sanctions or the consequences as probabilistic events, costs of doing
business which can be insured against, and (especially insofar as individuals rather than enter-
prises bear those costs) to providing for or allowing indemnification, so that a rather mechanical
system of choices and incentives and channels may be set up, again in contrast to a set of state-
ments which are to be listened to and responded to with a sense of obligation. The mechanical
systems so conceived tend to be short-lived, in concept and in action, if for no other reason than
that, for the well-advised, paying the price after the choice is made can become itself a matter of
choice, between paying and whatever the alternative to paying might be in the world as it then is.
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as there are formulations of law upon which lawyers would agree after
the exercise of legal method, they are formulations of considerations
directed at people deciding what to do. Some considerations are living
and the words are living and some considerations are dead and the
words that express them are dead. The living are voices which are
heard and attended to. The dead are not voices which are heard or
attended to; they are things which are handled.
Thus, and to end this excursion, if there is to be law it must be the
product of legal method. You do not ask, Is there law here? or, What
is the law here? without asking, What have judges, lawyers, or citizens
done with the materials from which a statement of law is made? What
have they done, how have they done it? You do not know whether
there is law or what it is without asking about method; to criticize the
method or execution of method by which a statement of law is
reached, or to question the possibility of fulfilling methodological
presuppositions, is to question the existence in the world or in fact of
the law posited by the statement.
This said - and I think physical scientists no less than lawyers
would find it a commonplace though they do occasionally talk as if
their facts existed apart from their method - we are in a position to
approach whether one must believe what one says if one is to make a
statement of law. Of course lawyers and judges and others do make
statements in which they do not believe, which they mean others of us
to think are statements of law and want us to pay attention to: our
question is whether such statements are statements of law.
I say we can approach our question. But if lawyers' method is so
very implicated we must find a means of approaching it without back-
ing ourselves into a professional corner which some may enter and
some may not - a means of pursuing what is necessary to the life and
perhaps the very existence of law in a way fruitful in itself and also
accessible to those who are not lawyers, who do after all have an inter-
est in the matter. It is never easy to straddle the line between profes-
sional discipline and the ordinary world. But law is more than most a
mix of the ordinary and the specially disciplined, and I think we may
be able to go some good distance considering even briefly the problem
of imitation.
III. IMITATION AND ATTITUDE
Imagine the following:
A law student visits a large law firm to be interviewed for a job.
We will put the time in the late 1960s. In the course of a required
conversation with a young associate the student describes the various
Deemrber 1987]
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arguments in Professor Yale Kamisar's article A Dissent from the Mi-
randa Dissents,3 which he had been studying carefully and liked very
much. Kamisar, the student says to the young associate, had engaged
in a wonderfully close and thorough reading of the dissenting Justices
in that celebrated 1966 case which is still today the focus for discussion
of police interrogation in the United States. The article was quite
long, the student remarks, but well worth working through.
Various things the student said ring bells in the young associate's
mind. After the interview is over, he goes over to his shelf and pulls
down a volume. And yes, there is his draft of a dissent in Miranda,
joined by four Justices, which he had written as a clerk on the Court,
It had been published with only a few editorial changes, he recalls
proudly. It was some of his best work. It sounded just like the Jus-
tice. He muses on the fact that his own words had been the subject of
Kamisar's painstaking analysis and had, in turn, taken up much of
that student's time. Thousands and thousands had read what he had
written. They had worked over his every nuance in the closest possi-
ble way.
There is an oddness in this, an irony? Perhaps, for some, a mad-
ness? If you are struck so, however faintly, the sense is worth pursu-
ing. Oddness, irony, hint of madness if tracked down can lead to a
clearer understanding of what it is to be a lawyer or indeed anything
else; even, I hope, to a clearer understanding of why lawyers them-
selves fall so often into a manipulative stance toward what they call
the law.
What we have in the vignette I have related is of course the pres-
ence of imitation in the field of law, and not simply the inevitable imi-
tation that is acknowledgment of influence and found in every work
and activity. Let us move outside law and approach the problem,
which writing of this kind raises for the lawyer, through the general
problem of imitation sights and sounds. Or almost outside law - I
shall use a legal case to start with. Talk about law is very difficult to
avoid.
Some years ago the Federal Trade Commission charged the Col-
gate-Palmolive Company with deceptive advertising in claiming to
demonstrate visually on television that Rapid Shave Shaving Cream
could shave sandpaper. What was being photographed by the televi-
sion camera was not sandpaper but plexiglas with sand sprinkled on it.
3. Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966) (on Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), revised and reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 41-76 (1980).
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On one side of the screen was an athlete shaving his sandpapery beard.
On the other was this mock sandpaper being shaved. The voice-over
chanted "Apply, soak, off with a stroke."
The company and the Association of Advertising Agencies argued
that this was not deceptive advertising since what the viewer saw was
true. The difference between plexiglas and sandpaper was immaterial.
The company was simply solving a practical difficulty by using what
was called in the trade a mockup. When televised, sandpaper looked
like ordinary paper; only sand on plexiglas looked like sandpaper. If
what the viewers saw was true then it made no difference that what
they were seeing was not what they thought they were seeing. What
they saw in fact, the manufacturer went on, was what they saw on the
television screen.
The Supreme Court agreed with the FTC prosecutors that the un-
disclosed use of a mockup in the sandpaper case was deceptive adver-
tising within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Although mockups could not be entirely prohibited, the advertiser
could at least be required to disclose with some frequency that it was
using a mockup. The case was not a clean one for consideration of the
issue. The fact was that Rapid Shave could not shave sandpaper ex-
cept after an extraordinarily long soak (which the athlete whose beard
the sandpaper was being compared to would never have tolerated).
But the issues of the use of the mockup, on the one hand, and the
transmission of an inaccurate message, on the other, were nominally
separated in the litigation, and the opinion put in question the use of
mockups generally4 - the use of mashed potatoes rather than ice
cream in ice cream commercials because studio lights melt ice cream
while it is being photographed, the use of soap to produce a foaming
head on seductively foaming drinks, or the substitution of colored
water for wine sipped by actors instructed to ad lib semi-sophisticated
conversation during scenes shot for wine advertisements, because of
the dozens of retakes often necessary to produce an acceptable com-
mercial and the consequent danger of incoherence and wild behavior
on the part of the actors.
We can agree that the reasons for using mockups are often unex-
4. Federal Trade Commn. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). The Court pro-
posed a distinction between an undisclosed mockup of a true testimonial, televised so that view-
ers could see it for themselves, and an undisclosed mockup of a true demonstration or
experiment televised for the same purpose; the former acceptable, the latter not, on the ground
that the proof being offered in the latter was not the experiment itself but the viewer's own
observation of the experiment. But the opinion went on to suggest that the undisclosed use of
any mockup, even mashed potato ice cream, that became important or "strategic" in a commer-
cial's implicit invitation to observe for oneself might be found to be a material deception.
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ceptionable. Why then did advertisers object and why do they object
still to disclosing that they use mockups? Their reply might invoke
the language of experimental psychology, but it would amount to say-
ing that the spell would be broken if they told. The viewer would be
disenchanted. He would cease to pay attention, or at least the kind of
attention desired: he would not take in, take into himself, absorb what
was being said, focus upon it, be absorbed by it. He would not be
spellbound, but instead removed, thinking of other things as he lis-
tened, if indeed he listened at all. And to help understand why the
spell would be broken and the televised picture lose its persuasive
force, we may recall the puzzling importance of the original in art.
One reason is the trust necessary when working with something that is
an imitation of the true or authentic thing. When one is presented with
a work of art that is to be taken seriously, one is asked to do a great
deal, to pay much attention to it and spend much time on it instead of
the other claimants competing for one's limited time and attention,
and most of all to take it into oneself, with the possibility that one may
change oneself as a result. If one is told that what one is seeing is an
imitation, one is at the mercy of another. One must invest trusting the
imitator's good faith, and will hedge and protect oneself from too great
vulnerability.
Quite apart from the necessity of relying upon another's word in so
important a matter, there is also the possibility that a small flaw in the
imitation may make all the difference. There is judgment involved in
determining what is a material and what is an immaterial difference
between the authentic object and the imitation. In architecture a few
degrees in the pitch of a roof or the change of a single window may
change the face of a building. In literature close reading attends to
detail, to nuance, individual word, the actual punctuation used. Thus
the new and better editions of a much-read novel, the variorum edi-
tions of the poets.5 A mockup cannot be trusted to hang together as
the real thing can, or perhaps it should be said that the presupposition
that actuality hangs together cannot be entertained when one is deal-
ing with constructed appearances, because a line, a pointer, an evi-
dence, a word, a tone that does not make sense may be - even if not
an attempt at manipulation - a simple mistake or poor judgment on
the part of the imitator, rather than a revelation that should drive one
on in one's seeking to understand the whole.
5. E.g., THE VARIORUM EDrION OF THE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS (P. Alit & R. Alspach eds.
1957); THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED POEMS, COMPLETE AND UN-
ABRIDGED 529-82 (E. Lathem ed. 1969); J. JOYCE, ULYSSES: THE CORRECTED TEXT ix-xiv,
647-50 (H. Gabler ed. 1986).
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The advertiser in the mockup case did not wish to disclose that it
was using mockups. I doubt that anyone knows how much attention
inveterate television viewers pay to what they see in commercials on
the screen and how much close reading of them they do, and therefore
how important the telling detail is in the advertising context; but ad-
vertisers certainly could suppose that a viewer would have no reason
to trust advertisers' avowals that a mockup was a true reproduction:
advertisers have every reason to believe that such spell as is cast by the
vision of ice cream or sandpaper would be lost if they were required to
say that what is being transmitted is mashed potatoes made to look
like ice cream or plexiglas made to look like sandpaper. Judges stand
in a somewhat different position. Judges are surely more worthy of
trust than advertisers. One may ask therefore why they might not
wish to disclose that their opinions are drafted in whole or in part by
clerks or a central staff when that is the case. If, for instance, the
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,6
viewed by many as the charter for modem judicial review of legisla-
tion in the United States, was written by Professor Louis Lusky as a
clerk and approved by Chief Justice Stone, why was the opinion, or
part of the opinion, not signed by both Lusky and Stone, or signed
Stone, As Told To Lusky?7 The problem in law, I suggest, is much
more the problem of imitation itself and its suitability for close read-
ing, its capacity, if you will, to persuade another to invest himself in its
analysis. For legal texts are asking listeners not just to buy a can of
shaving cream but to act in ways that affect their lives, and legal texts
are put forth not in a thirty second spot but as material for years of
analysis and argument.
We spoke of a spell being broken when what is thought to be au-
thentic is revealed to be imitation and a mockup. The viewer, listener,
or reader is disenchanted when the spell a thing has cast on his atten-
tion is broken and he turns away from it. But of course when we are
not disenchanted, we are on the other side. We are enchanted. And
that may be troubling. There is magic in enchantment, being in the
grip of an illusion perhaps. But when all is said and done, it is the
sense of the actual that enchants and draws out our action from us.
That we also know. And that, drawing out our action from us, is the
reason for law's drive for the actual in all the ways in which law
reveals that drive.
I suggested at the beginning that law's drive for the actual may be
6. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
7. Lusky, Footnote Redu=" A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1982); A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 513 (1956).
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fully as pressing as any that one can perceive in other disciplines, and
related, like those of other disciplines, to the thirst for the sense of the
actual in everyday life. Consider the rather complicated enchantment
of the theater, which in imitating the actual has its own mimetic au-
thenticities. As one sits in the dark listening to galloping horses com-
ing to the rescue of a maiden, one does not really want to know that
those galloping horses are toilet plungers being pressed by the sound
man against his chest. A dubbed film, in which the dialogue is written
to fit the movements of the mouths of the actors rather as a ghost-
writer will write to fit the mouth of a purported author, is not quite the
same theatrical experience as the foreign film with subtitles. Or take
Tarzan. A boy or man sits watching a movie Tarzan swinging
through the woods uttering a victory cry and admires that cry, won-
dering half-secretly whether that might be his cry too. It is deflating
to learn that Tarzan's yell is no human expression, but a sound track
brew consisting of a dog's bark, a camel's bleat, a hyena's yowl and
some snatches of Johnny Weissmuller. Consider the modern experi-
ence of music. The rock-and-roll fan basking at last in the televised
presence of his favorite band feels somewhat less close to them when
he realizes that in their performance before him they are simply
mouthing the words and pretending to play their instruments, with the
sound coming from a tape played over the speaker system. (It often
has to be a tape because of the way a rock-and-roll song is typically
produced, with instrument recorded over instrument, voices and
pieces of voices fed in, funneled through echo chambers, modulated
and variously amplified.) The opera lover swooning to a beautifully
executed duet on the radio between two sopranos, listening to the ris-
ing interplay of the voices and thinking that the perfect unity of two
souls might be a real possibility, is jolted when the announcer tells him
that he has just heard Elly Ameling singing with herself in a splendid
demonstration of electronic technology. He may still like what he
heard, but his thoughts do not fit. Occasionally disenchantment is de-
picted for us in a way that makes it possible to laugh about the loss.
At the beginning of Monty Python and the Holy Grail the galloping
and clomping of horses' hooves are heard in a forest. Then a knight
appears trotting along as if he were on a horse, but on foot, and behind
him appears his squire laden down with backpacks and pots and pans,
clip-clopping together two coconuts to give the effect of a horse.
There is a difference, however, between ordinary experience and
the experience of law or the various other disciplines of inquiry. We
might be better off thrilling to the rescue of the maiden, admiring the
victory cry of the noble savage, basking in the presence of the rock
[Vol. 86:577
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band and swooning to the duet, if the price is merely being deceived.
That may be a matter of choice upon which one need not take too
definite a position. But the disciplines of inquiry, including law, do
not have quite the same choice, for their methods are designed to un-
mask the unauthentic. They probe and they probe. That is what they
do. That is the business of the practitioner of the discipline. And if
their material dissolves in their hands they are not better off, except
insofar as the act of close reading was a pleasurable exercise in itself.
But I do not think there is that much difference between the disci-
plines of inquiry and ordinary experience. Music and the theater come
to an end and we go out into the dark. We keep only whatever of the
actual and the authentic was captured there. Thrilling, admiring, bask-
ing are not just passive states. They push the person on to act in vari-
ous ways, to take one turn rather than another in his life. One who
admires will emulate, and if he tries a Tarzan's yell that is in fact made
up of hyenas, dogs, and camels, he will find, like the legal analyst, that
his material is not much use to him.
I passed on earlier a story - would it make a difference if the facts
of that story were true or only put forth as if they were true? - about
a law student and law professor and the clerk who had written the
words which student and professor had parsed in their effort to under-
stand the law of police interrogation in the United States. There is
another story to be told about those same texts - the professor's law
review article and the opinions of the Justices which the professor had
used in his article.
The student had read the professor's article carefully, mulled it
over and considered it. The professor had read the dissents to the
Miranda opinion carefully, mulled them over and considered them.
The title of the article, after all, was A Dissent from the Miranda Dis-
sents. But both, student and professor, had also of course read closely
the majority opinion in the case, the opinion for the Court. Professor
Kamisar had sought not merely to demolish the dissents. He main-
tained that the constitutional prohibition against interrogation in the
absence of counsel extended well beyond the police station, where the
interrogation in Miranda itself had occurred. In support he naturally
cited, inter alia, the opinion for the Court in Miranda. Three times it
defined "custodial interrogation" as questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person had been taken into custody "or
otherwise deprived of his freedom."'8 When the definition was initially
stated in the opinion it seemed to include a qualification. The phrase
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 477, 478 (1966).
December 1987]
Michigan Law Review
"in any significant way" followed the phrase "deprived of his free-
dom." But at the two other places including the final summation
where "custodial interrogation" was explained, "significant" was
dropped. At one point the phrase was deprived of his freedom "in any
way." At another it was simply "deprived of his freedom," without
more. Kamisar read the opinion as a whole and put forth his interpre-
tation in an effort to answer a major question for those seeking in good
faith to know the law and to apply it - lawyers, appellate judges, trial
judges, prosecutors, police: whether police interrogation, without prior
warning of the right to a lawyer, could take place outside the police
station, on the streets for instance, or in a person's home. (The
doctrinal question channeling and molding distinctions on such partic-
ulars, it should be said, was whether interrogation itself, or instead
deprivation of bodily liberty, was to be the primary analytic focus.)
After Professor Kamisar published his article, a judge who had
read the article as carefully as Kamisar had read the opinion, and who
had checked Kamisar's citations, wrote that Kamisar had misread the
majority opinion on this point. The initial "in any significant way"
was not, as Kamisar argued, a throwaway phrase. It appeared in con-
junction with each reference in the opinion to deprivation of freedom.
Kamisar rushed to the bound report on the shelves. The words were
indeed there, as the judge said. But like Winston in Orwell's 1984 he
knew the words were not there when he had written his article and
participated in a dozen colloquia on the subject of police questioning
after Miranda. What had happened?
What had happened was that he had relied upon the Preliminary
Prints of the official United States Reports, which are sent out many
months after the initial release of an opinion and before the binding of
those prints into an annual volume. His article had been published
between the time of the appearance of the preliminary prints and the
time of binding. Before the prints were bound, the type had been bro-
ken and the words inserted in the two places where they were not to be
found before, 9 something it would never occur to anyone to do to
paragraphs of journalism in the daily newspaper at the point of bind-
ing them for the shelves; but then judicial opinions are not journalism,
even though like the newspaper there is always next day's opinion to
read.
No one outside the Court knows whether it was the public discus-
sions at conferences reflected in the article which had prompted the
9. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 477, 478 (preliminary print), with Miranda, 384
U.S. 436, 444, 477, 478 (bound volume).
[Vol. 86:577
Law and Enchantment
change, or who suggested the change, or how the change was ex-
plained to the Justices who had agreed to the opinion, or whether the
busy Justices let their clerks decide if the change was acceptable. But
there is no question that someone at the Court, like the professor, the
judge, and the student, was proceeding upon a methodological presup-
position of close reading, to which such a matter as symmetry of phra-
seology is important (hardly, of course, dispositive: nothing is
dispositive except a final satisfaction of a desire to understand; but
then, too, nothing is unimportant). This is scarcely surprising, since
close reading is the method of the law and what is principally taught
in law schools.
But we cannot stop there. Close reading itself proceeds upon a
presupposition, that what is read is suitable for close reading, which
means generally that at the least it is not an imitation, not a mockup.
IV. THE PRESUPPOSITION OF AUTHENTICITY
From this, what we may call the presupposition of authenticity in
legal method, much of what is distinctive about law and being a law-
yer can be drawn, and from the difficulty of maintaining the presuppo-
sition of authenticity in practice arise many of the dilemmas of law
and the lawyer. The situation in which our student and professor
would find themselves if they had to confront a discovery that the ma-
terial they were using from the Supreme Court was written by a recent
law graduate, who could have been one of the professor's students just
past, is something like the situation in which art critics and art histori-
ans found themselves when a number of Etruscan statues at the Met-
ropolitan Museum of Art turned out, after decades of being admired,
to be imitation Etruscan statues. When the statues were moved to the
basement, so were the Ph.D. dissertations and scholarly articles based
upon them. Or, to use an analogy less fine, student and professor,
discovering that they had pored over words that were not the Justice's
own words but an imitation that the Justice had adopted, might well
feel somewhat like a teenage boy or girl captivated by a movie star,
who goes to a movie over and over again to see the nude scenes and
then discovers that the star's nude scenes are always played by a
double, selected by the star and the star's mother. They are cheated,
but more importantly, they are distanced from the material they are
working with. It is not just the lack of disclosure that the body is not
the star's, or that the art object is not an original, or that a judge's
opinion is a piece of writing constructed by someone else to look
enough like the writing of a judge to pass. It is the imitation, the lack
of authenticity itself, that is the problem.
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Bureaucratic writing of judicial opinions is now widespread in both
federal and state courts in the United States and knowledge of how
such texts are produced is becoming widespread. I do not think that
the impact of this development will be merely that judges will lose the
special respect that Brandeis attributed to their being the only govern-
ment officials who do their own work - though the relative respect in
which judges are in fact held is enormously important. The risk, the
danger, the cost is, I think, loss of authority and with it loss of law
itself, not just respect for judges as individuals, but respect for law.
And the reason has much to do with legal method, the method that is
taught in law schools and that lawyers use when asked to say what the
law is. They read the authorities, principally the opinions of judges,
closely and critically. And just as literary critics feel foolish in apply-
ing elaborate techniques of literary analysis to segments of a book that
turn out to have been ghostwritten by an editor, lawyers simply have
to have difficulty reading ghostwritten texts as if they were authentic.
Lawyers cannot read the bureaucratic product of administrative agen-
cies as they read or want to read judges' opinions. They are cynical
and manipulative toward what comes out of a large agency. 10 And it
is precisely not being manipulative, it is approaching a source of law
such as a judicial opinion in a good faith effort to understand it and
follow its meaning, that the authority of law is about. Of course all of
us are manipulative to an extent, and little if any writing is fully au-
thentic in the sense that it reflects only what the author truly believes
- about what the law is, or anything else. Pointing to a loss of au-
thority is no assertion that anything less than the fully authentic is
unacceptable, or that it is an easy matter to discern what the fully
authentic is or would be or how that which rings true rings truer
through irony, obliqueness, and the other means of expression that are
sometimes contrasted with what is thought to be sincere talk. What is
to be concluded is simply that there is a price paid for not fulfilling the
presuppositions of legal reasoning, which include the presupposition
that there is a responsible mind behind judicial writing, not imitating a
judge, but being a judge. The price paid is the relative loss of the sense
of obligation.
10. This has been a source of contention in American administrative law for well over a
generation. A representative example of the expressed disquiet is the "Hector Memorandum" to
President Eisenhower, a portion of which was published as Government by Anonymity: Who
Writes Our Regulatory Opinions?, 45 A.B.A. J. 45 (1959). For the full text, see Hector, Problems
of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960), especially at
931-32, 939-48. Discussion by litigation may be said to have begun with the Morgan cases in the
late 1930s. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (Morgan I); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan 11); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV).
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Could it be said that law is convention only, and is not at all like a
movie star's body, or even an Etruscan statue? Whatever the judge
adopts, even if he or she has not read it, that is by definition the law?
Judges strumming their rubber-stringed guitars are giving out the law
because that is what law is and all law is? Convention does not work
for the adopting author himself. President Reagan, when challenged
during the 1980 campaign on the ground that a position he was taking
was inconsistent with what he had said in one of his syndicated news-
paper columns, candidly responded that he had not written that col-
umn. It had been ghostwritten, and was not evidence of what he
believed; therefore he was not inconsistent. No sitting president would
look to his speeches to determine what he believed if he was thinking
about a subject in a perplexed way. His speeches would not help him,
being in the main ghostwritten by a large staff, and it cannot be
imagined that a judge would look back to a published opinion drafted
by a clerk if he later finds it has starting points, structure, nuances and
phrases which were not his and did not reflect his thought. "Did I say
that? Dear me. Let me see how I can handle it." And handle it he
would: he would turn the opinion into a fiction, distinguish it, reinter-
pret it, or conveniently ignore it. Thus, perhaps, the reluctance of
many courts to allow unpublished opinions drafted by central staff in
cases deemed routine by the staff to be cited and given precedential
weight, though those cases are decided in the name of the court and
the opinions may be signed per curiam. 11
The lawyer outside the court would be in a somewhat different
position from that of the judge within. He would not know what the
judge knew. But his method, his close reading, might lead him to sus-
picion and more. And if it were revealed, if he were told that the work
was not the judge's own, then he would be very much in the judge's
position. That, we may fear, is what is happening as judicial
bureaucratization is being ever more widely perceived. It is very
doubtful that convention can overcome the problem of imitation -
the problem of its suitability for close reading, the problem of its ca-
pacity to persuade someone to invest himself in its analysis in any seri-
ous way. Trying to make oneself pretend that what one is reading is
something one knows it is not puts one into a world like the world of
1984. This is of course the classic difficulty with administrative bu-
reaucracy. It seems efficient, but it is alienating. The responsible head
is not really responsible for what happens, certainly not for what hap-
11. See, eg., Reynolds & Richmond, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 573-74 & n.4, 624-25 &
n.154 (1981); N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
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pens in the particular. There is no one responsible in that central
sense, from which the notion of "civil" and "political" responsibility
was derived before being detached. 12 The outcome is just the result of
the system or the process, and nothing more.
There is the associated general question why any discipline that
depends upon authority is interested in historical authenticity, or what
I think Judith Thomson would call "causal embeddedness" or "em-
beddedness in history"'13 - to which we should at least allude because
it is part of the context of our discussion here. Why really would it
make a difference if it turned out that the Constitutional Convention
was a hoax, an illusion fabricated by clever propagandists, or that the
fourteenth amendment was more flawed in its adoption than is already
known, or that the facts of a precedent were entirely made up, or in-
deed that Christ did not actually live but was only supposed to have
lived? An interest in historical authenticity seems associated with ask-
ing others to rely upon one's claim. In citing a particularized legisla-
tive statement, constitution, or event of significance, decisionmaking
individuals are not themselves taking a stick and punishing someone.
They are ordering someone or setting the conditions for someone to be
ordered, with public force to follow. A juror trying fact wants (as does
the law of evidence), Thomson suggests, causal embeddedness in a
12. Even in the extreme case of complete delegation, of which the Queen of England, adviser
rather than advisee, may be taken as an example, an official may continue to sign statements with
her name and announce decisions in her voice. We might be tempted to think she remains
responsible, simply as a matter of definition. But in this we would not be true to law's usage.
There is a difficulty, to be sure, but law's use of the term responsible handles the difficulty by
moving through appearances to the actuality of persons.
In law, when we insist that someone did do or say something and is responsible, we generally
mean she should take the consequences of her acts and statements. She is civilly responsible, and
should be a source of compensation. She is criminally responsible, and should be deterred or
punished. She is politically responsible, and may be replaced.
But if what is at stake is the very making of the decision with respect to allocation of civil
liability or the very statement of the considerations to be taken into account to avoid condemna-
tion, then we are not interested in money payments, deterrence, or punishment. We do not say
the speaker or actor is responsible. We say she should be responsible, or we want her to be,
because we want the decision or statement to be a responsible one. (And if it continues to be the
case that no one is responsible, political replacement is of no avail.) The decision or statement
must be responsibly made before we can truly take account of it - before it itself can have much
in the way of consequences in the world.
In this context the legal term responsible is used somewhat (though not entirely) differently
from the way it is used in the phrases "civil responsibility," "criminal responsibility," or "polit-
ical responsibility," for we are in some sense prior to the structures of discussion by which we
determine responsibility of these latter kinds. It is thus possible to say that a person not responsi-
ble for a decision did not make it, and that what she appeared to do she did not do (as in the case
of the Queen). Human action and responsibility are still conjoined, but the mind's movement is
from responsibility to speech or action, rather than from speech or action to responsibility. Con-
nections with the law's conception and expression of insanity are evident.
13. J. Thomson, remarks presented at Sunderland Fellowship Colloquium, Michigan Law
School (Feb. 18, 1986) (discussing Thomson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, in RIGHTS,
RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 225-50 (W. Parent ed. 1986)).
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case, some particularized or "individualized" evidence linking the de-
fendant to the harm as well as evidence of general probability, because
she is going to have others do something on the basis of her conclu-
sion. The judge searching for law may also want historical authentic-
ity in the materials with which she works because, again it may be
suggested, she is going to do and have others do something in the
world in reliance on them. Both touch upon authority, both have
something to do with the mystery of the real and the possibility of
faith, in the real but in no other. The connection that is demanded,
however, is not, I think, to any wholly external truth, but rather to
belief. Those relying upon authoritative texts want to rely upon the
belief of those who uttered them. Those relying upon a determination
of fact can want similarly to rely upon the belief of those who deter-
mined the fact. Belief is associated with responsibility, and ultimately
with faith. But more, in law a determination of fact is always a deter-
mination of value. It involves the application of rules of inference - if
one may call them rules; they are not mathematical - which are
adopted in pursuit of values ("this evidence is sufficient for this con-
clusion for these purposes"). The belief to which there is connection
and desire for connection is belief in those values, which is, after all,
what makes them live.
And here may be the appropriate point to remark one of the ways
the materials of law may indeed be unlike an Etruscan statue. One
might think that even in a crude imitation there is at least the gross
form of the original, enough of the spirit of it to discern and be guided
by, 14 just as there is in a poor performance of a score or a script. But
law may not be a performance, since the script is changed forever, in
what would in law be analogous to performance, because the elements
of the script are living. Though the mysterious attraction of art, its
authority, is a matter of constant debate, there is at least the possibility
that art is in the settled smiling beyond. Law never is. Similarly, in
law there may not be the theoretical possibility of the perfect imitation
(put aside the problem of method, the application and attention that
must be sustained by a presupposition of authenticity) that there may
be thought to be in art, since in law, as in life and the detection of a
phoney person or the phoney in a person by a child, what is being
imitated is not there and settled.
Again, the question is not just what is practically possible. The
question is what the true costs and benefits are as we go about trying
to solve the difficult problems of communal life in one way or another.
14. See Arnheim, On Duplication, in THE FORGER'S ART 232 (D. Dutton ed. 1983).
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Legislatures and legislation and the reading of them must be left to
another day. 15 Here we need note only that to the extent the writing
of the judicial branch, or of the lawyer giving advice on what the law
is, is the outcome of bureaucratic processes, to that extent it is in dan-
ger of losing its claim upon us and failing to leave us with a sense of
obligation and willing obedience after we read and hear it. If it is
simply impossible in the modem world to sustain the conditions in
which a sense of willing obedience or obligation can arise, then that
may be a source of modem malaise about which nothing can be done.
Max Weber spoke of the iron cage 16 of bureaucratic capitalism, the
self-regulating and self-sustaining system into which we all had blun-
dered and from which he despaired of our ever extricating ourselves.
This that we see happening may be an aspect of the cage - the law
involved in the structure of Weber's iron cage, internal bureaucratiza-
tion in law a growth of his cage, produced perhaps by the same condi-
tions that produced the cage itself.
But in this too may lie an opening. Weber, I think, took the law as
a given, a phenomenon there and given from without. But the law is
not a given. It is created anew in every live class that is taught where
mind meets mind, in every argument in court where mind meets mind,
in every late-night wrestling of a legal adviser with his materials when
he is responsible for the consequences of his advice and cannot leave
the matter to a judge. If law does not live, it becomes something to be
dealt with by ingenuity, and lawyers' ingenuity with dead words is
hardly less than engineers' more visible ingenuity with the problems
presented to them by the lifeless material world. Law sustains
Weber's cage, but law does not sustain itself. Law is sustained by law-
yers, and their method leads them to dissolve away the dead.
We are not really very far away from Weber's time. The conse-
quences of what is called rational bureaucratic organization of the so-
cial world have hardly yet begun to unfold, and such an opening up of
an iron cage almost of its own accord, through internal bureaucratiza-
tion and law's losing its grip upon us, may be one of the consequences.
Where would we be if we stepped through the opening? Back before
Weber's time? Or in a new reign of terror - where nothing even mas-
15. What can be hoped for in this connection I have touched upon in J. VINING, THE Au-
THORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN chs. 9 & 10 (1986). An example of current question-
ing within the profession of the special status of statutes and the spell they cast is G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
16. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181-83 (T. Par-
sons trans. 1958). An analysis of Weber's view of law, and his Rechtssoziologie in particular, is to




querades as law and words and texts are not the vehicles of com-
mands? The cage (or now the illusion of the cage) might be better.
But we must not enter into such speculation. Those who have some
sense of journey in human history, of truth that is not simply replace-
ment of one illusion by another, of the opening out of human percep-
tion and self-knowledge and of movement, however halting and
however long drawn out, toward freedom and justice at the end,
would soon be pitted against those who have not any vestige of such
faith - or who think they have none; and perhaps you and I would
not know which side to take in the fray. That would be an embarrass-
ment that no guest should bring upon his hosts.
V. THE QUESTION AGAIN
From this brief discussion of spells, which began as a discussion of
authenticity and which has been in the main a discussion of bureau-
cracy, I return to the question of whether one must believe or (as we
also say) mean what one says when one oneself makes a statement of
law. When one oneself mechanically fashions a statement and it is not
one's own because one does not believe it, or for that matter disbelieve
it - it being fashioned merely by imitative manipulation - speaker
and spoken are separated quite as much as they are in bureaucratic
writing. Such statements by an individual lawyer or judge are not just
"no less unsuitable" for legal analysis - dissolved "no less" by good
legal analysis - than statements of bureaucratic origin. Are they not
the same?
If we are inclined to say they are, we may dare to think and play
with the thought that there must indeed be the element of belief in
what one says if one is to make a statement of law. Law and legal
language are perhaps not so impersonal as is commonly thought. Not
long ago Grant Gilmore commented in his summing up, The Ages of
American Law, that "[t]he function of the lawyer is to preserve a scep-
tical relativism." 17 Gilmore himself was evidence to the contrary. He
certainly believed this or that with respect to the substantive law in his
field. His writings declare his confidence in his own work and percep-
tion. But it is evidently and always a trouble to lawyers that belief
might be demanded of them professionally, and I think the reason is
not so much popular role definitions like that repeated by even so
sophisticated a commentator as Gilmore; nor the subtly daunting ne-
cessity of implicitly resolving open questions of legal method as best
they can in doing the best they can to arrive at statements that are
17. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977).
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their own; nor even the burden of responsibility imposed on them by
political theory, being now developed by Philip Soper, which grounds
citizens' obligation on the belief of legal officers in the justice of what
they officially do.18 Rather the reason for lawyers' trouble with belief
lies in great part, I think, in their difficulty in seeing how a willingness
to change one's mind or belief can be consistent with any belief, a
difficulty shared by any reflective and open-minded person in the mod-
em world, professional or not.
But hard as believing with an open mind is to do, men and women
do seem to do it. I have commented on this elsewhere, and particu-
larly on the question who it is who is really doing the believing. Let
me suggest here - and in doing so refer also to the beautiful recent
work of James Boyd White on law and language 19 - that in defining
what we believe we enter into notions that open out into the future,
not into closed systems. The very terms of our descriptions of what we
believe or think we believe, our noun-like terms, in fact have the qual-
ity of verbs as well as nouns; a true description of what one believed
earlier has in it the seeds of reconciliation with what one believes now.
Put mathematics and mathematical analogies aside. Despite what we
may have been taught in elementary school, distinctions between noun
and verb do not hold: in the very statement of what one believes at a
particular point one is carried forward from that time toward the reali-
zation of a hope. And though that hope may not be realized or be
possible to realize in one's individual life, still one cannot divorce one-
self from its realization.
The general run of people putting belief into words may sense this
with less difficulty than the disciplined professional, whose discipline is
very likely to be enamored still with the possibility of substituting
mathematics for human language.20 Large numbers of the general run
(those whose use of language provides the material for professional
study of language) listen with every evidence of understanding to
Christian and Jewish theologians and ministers explicating the name
of God, and one cannot help but be struck by the standard observation
in Biblical commentary 2 that when Jehovah replies to Moses' insis-
18. P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984).
19. J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); J.B. WHITE, HERACLES'
Bow (1985).
20. Mathematics, that is, as it is generally conceived both inside and outside the professional
discipline of mathematics. For a partial objection to the characterization of mathematics I have
here in mind, see the Introduction to I. LAKATOS, PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS: THE LOGIC OF
MATHEMATICAL DISCOVERY (1976).
21. E.g., "God, Names of" in 2 THE INTERPRETER'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 409-11




tence on a name to take back to the Israelites, the Hebrew of his reply
- "I am that I am, that is who I am, tell them I am sent you" - has a
quality not just of being but of becoming. The translation into English
using our static English "be," "am," "is," is read as the ancient He-
brew, and without much difficulty, suggesting not only much about
translation and its affinities with the act of reading itself, but a capac-
ity within to understand the thought of the ancient Hebrew. We are
not limited by our nouns and verbs, as an artificial intelligence would
be. Or, to say the same, the apparent meaning of words and their
actual meaning are not the same, as the objectivist would have them
be: our nouns, like our verb "to be," only appear to be static. And it
is of interest that in much Western theology this openness and move-
ment in human language is connected in an explicit way with the per-
sonhood of God. The ultimate object of knowledge and belief, toward
which our descriptive terms so full of movement move, is within the
world of theology a person, as I think it is also in worlds that today
know nothing of theology.
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